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Abstract
This paper continues Dietrich and List's [2010] work on propositional-
attitude aggregation theory, which is a generalised uniﬁcation of the
judgment-aggregation and probabilistic opinion-pooling literatures. We
ﬁrst propose an algebraic framework for an analysis of (many-valued)
propositional-attitude aggregation problems. Then we shall show
that systematic propositional-attitude aggregators can be viewed as
homomorphisms in the category of C.C. Chang's [1958] MV-algebras.
Since the 2-element Boolean algebra as well as the real unit interval can be
endowed with an MV-algebra structure, we obtain as natural corollaries
two famous theorems: Arrow's theorem for judgment aggregation as well
as McConway's [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Dietrich and List [2010] have proposed the fundamentals of a
general theory of aggregation, with the aim of creating a unified theory of
preference aggregation, judgment aggregation (cf. List and Puppe [2009]
for a survey), probabilistic opinion pooling and more general many-valued
aggregation problems. In a very general logical framework, Dietrich and
List [2010] have proved that for suﬃcently complex aggregation problems,
all independent and Paretian aggregators are already systematic (a stronger
independence condition, known as Strong Setwise Property in the probabilistic
opinion pooling literature following McConway [1981]). In an earlier paper,
Dietrich and List [2008] had already shown that judgment aggregation can be
treated as a special case of generalised probabilistic opinion pooling and that in
this setting, Arrow's dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation
is a special case of a generalisation of McConway's [1981] characterisation of
linear opinion pools.
∗I would like to thank Professor Christian List for helpful conversations.
†Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Universitätsstraße
25, D-33615 Bielefeld, Germany. E-mail address: fherzberg@uni-bielefeld.de
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So far, however, no characterisations of general systematic many-valued
propositional-attitude aggregators are known, nor has the case of inﬁnite
electorates been treated as yet. The present paper attempts to ﬁll this gap: We
generalise the main idea in Herzberg [2010] and prove that systematic many-
valued propositional-attitude aggregators are homomorphisms in the category
of MV-algebras (for short: MV-homomorphisms) as deﬁned by C.C. Chang
[1958a]. For the special case of a ﬁnite electorate, we obtain as natural corollaries
both Arrow's dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation and
McConway's [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools.
We should note at this point that the use of algebraic  in particular, lattice-
theoretic and Boolean algebraic  methods has a long tradition in preference
aggregation theory, cf. e.g. D.J. Brown [1974] and the monographs by Kim
and Roush [1980] or Aleskerov [1999].1 (A proof of Arrow's [1963] impossibility
theorem using ultraﬁlters was published by Fishburn even as early as 1970.)
Some authors have also employed ﬁlters and ultraﬁlters to establish impossibility
theorems in judgment aggregation (e.g. Daniëls [2006], Dietrich and Mongin
[2010] and Klamler and Eckert [2009]). Moreover, the relation between merging
of opinions and certain functional equations  which often can be interpreted
as homomorphy relations!  has long been recognised in the opinion pooling
literature (cf. e.g. Aczél, Kannapan, Ng and Wagner [1983] and Aczél [1989]).
Nevertheless, with the exception of the aforementioned paper (Herzberg [2010]),
the published literature does not contain any systematic approaches to tackle
general aggregation problems from an algebraic, lattice-theoretic perspective.
In this paper, we will ﬁrst outline a formal framework for rather general
many-valued aggregation problems by means of the notion of an MV-algebra
(Section 2). We shall then list a number of assumptions, mainly generalisations
of standard Arrovian responsiveness axioms for the aggregation functions
(Section 3). Thereafter, we shall state a characterisation theorem for aggregators
as MV-algebra homomorphisms and derive two well-known corollaries from
judgment aggregation and probabilistic opinion pooling (Section 4); the proofs
can be found in an appendix. Possible extensions of our methodology are
discussed in the ﬁnal Section 5.
2 Formal framework
In the following, we describe a formal model for the aggregation of many-valued
propositional attitudes. The electorate will be given by some (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
set N . In addition, a set of propositions X (agenda) in a suﬃciently expressive
language will be ﬁxed, and the electorate as well as each individual will be
supposed to display a certain attitude towards each proposition in the agenda
(thus assigning a truth value). The set of possible attitudes or truth values will
be denoted M (and will be assumed to possess some additional structure, viz.
that of an MV-algebra). Thus, each individual expresses his or her attitudes
towards the elements of the agenda through a function from X to M , called
attitude function. Then the attitudes of all individuals can be captured by an
N -sequence of attitude functions (i.e. by a map from N to MX); such an N -
sequence will be called proﬁle. An aggregator is then simply a map from (a
suitable subset of the set of) the set of proﬁles to the set of attitude functions.
1I would like to thank Professor Bernard Monjardet at this point.
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2.1 Agenda syntax
Let L be the language of many-valued propositional logic. In other words,
let L be the language whose symbols consist of countably many propositional
variables, a propositional constant 0 (falsehood), a binary operation ⊕ (strong
disjunction) and a unary operator ¬ (negation). The set of well-formed formulae
in this language shall be denoted L.
A number of standard abbreviations will be helpful. First, we deﬁne a new
propositional constant 1 (truth) by ¬0. Next, we deﬁne additional operations.
The operation of weak disjunction (denoted ∨) will be deﬁned via
∀p, q ∈ L p ∨ q = ¬(¬p⊕ q)⊕ q,
and strong conjunction (denoted ⊗) as well as weak conjunction (denoted ∧)
can then be deﬁned through De Morgan's laws:
∀p, q ∈ L p⊗ q = ¬(¬p⊕ ¬q),
p ∧ q = ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q).
The implication operation (denoted →) can be deﬁned as
p→ q = ¬p⊕ q.
(In their original paper, Łukasiewicz and Tarski [1930] took ¬ and → as the
primitive logical symbols of their language.) Łukasiewicz logic is then given by
the provability relation `, given by modus ponens (i.e. for all p, q ∈ L and
S ⊆ L, if S ` p and S ` (p→ q), then S ` q) and the following axiom schemes:
For all p, q ∈ L,
A1. For all p, q ∈ L, the proposition p→ (q → p) is an axiom.
A2. For all p, q ∈ L, the proposition (p → q) → ((q → r)→ (p→ r)) is an
axiom.
A3. For all p, q ∈ L, the proposition ((p→ q)→ q) → ((q → p)→ p) is an
axiom.
A4. For all p, q ∈ L, the proposition (¬p→ ¬q)→ (q → p) is an axiom.
(Cf. Rose and Rosser [1958] and Chang [1958b].)
One can deﬁne a relation ≡, called provable equivalence, on L by saying that
p is provably equivalent to q (denoted p ≡ q) if and only if both ` (p → q) as
well as ` (q → p) (wherein ` p is, for all p ∈ L, shorthand for ∅ ` p). It is not
diﬃcult to verify that ≡ is an equivalence relation on L. The set of equivalence
classes shall be denoted L/ ≡. Representative-wise, one can deﬁne the constant
0, the operator ¬ and the operation ⊕ on L/ ≡; again, it is not hard to prove
that these are well-deﬁned. Therefore, the operations ⊗,∨,∧,→ can be deﬁned
on L as well.
2.2 Agenda semantics
Recall that an MV-algebra M is a structure (M,⊕,¬, 0) such that (M,⊕, 0) is a
commutative monoid (i.e. ⊕ is a commutative and associative binary operation
on M with neutral element 0) and the following identities are satisﬁed for all
x, y ∈M :
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• ¬¬x = x,
• x⊕ 1 = 1,
• x ∨ y = y ∨ x,
wherein 1 is shorthand for ¬0 and ∨ is deﬁned via
∀x, y ∈M x ∨ y = ¬(¬x⊕ y)⊕ y.
It turns out that the structure (L/ ≡,⊕,¬, 0), i.e. the set of equivalence
classes of provably equivalent formulae from many-valued propositional logic
with the canonical operations, is an MV-algebra, the so-called Lindenbaum
algebra for Łukasiewicz's many-valued logic. This observation allows us to
take an algebraic approach to the semantics of many-valued propositional logic,
essentially due to C.C. Chang [1958a, 1959]: Let us henceforth assume that the
truth values form an MV-algebra; we shall hence ﬁx an MV-algebra M for the
rest of this paper and shall refer to it as the set of truth values. Under these
hypotheses, an M -valuation can be deﬁned as an MV-algebra homomorphism
from L/ ≡ to M . If I is an M -valuation and p ∈ L, we shall usually simply
write I(p) instead of I([p]≡).
Important examples of MV-algebras are the following (cf. already Chang
[1958a]):
• Any Boolean algebra is an MV-algebra.
• If M = [0, 1], the set of all real numbers between 0 and 1, one obtains
an MV-algebra with zero element 0 by setting ¬x = 1 − x and x ⊕ y =
min{x+ y, 1} for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]. This is called the standard MV-algebra.
It is the set of truth values for the inﬁnite-valued logic Li1 .
• With the same deﬁnitions for 0, ¬ and ⊕, the set M = [0, 1] ∩Q (the set
of all rational numbers between 0 and 1) is an MV-algebra; it is the set of
truth values for Łukasiewicz's inﬁnite-valued logic Lℵ0 .
• Again with the same deﬁnitions for 0, ¬ and ⊕, the set M =
{0, 1/m, . . . , (m− 1)/m, 1} is an MV-algebra for every positive integer m.
It is the set of truth values for Łukasiewicz's (m+ 1)-valued logic Lm+1.
Rose and Rosser [1958] and Chang [1959] have shown, each by a diﬀerent
method, the completeness of Lℵ0 .
2.3 Attitude functions
Consider a set X ⊆ L, henceforth called the agenda. Attitude functions are
functions from X to M . An attitude function A is rational if and only if it can
be extended to an M -valuation, i.e. there exists an M -valuation I such that
A(p) = I([p]≡) for all p ∈ X. Therefore, any rational attitude function A is also
well-deﬁned not only on X, but on the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕. A (rational)
proﬁle is an N -sequence of (rational) attitude functions. An attitude aggregator
is a map from a subset of the set of proﬁles to the set of attitude functions. An
attitude aggregator is a dictatorship if and only if there exists some i ∈ N such
that F (A) = Ai for all i ∈ N .
An important observation is the extendibility of rational attitude functions:
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Remark 1. Denote the closure of the agenda under ¬ and ⊕ by Y . Any rational
attitude function can be uniquely extended to a function from Y to M .
We shall always identify the extension of any rational attitude function A
with its extension to Y . Thus, in the following, all rational attitude functions
are assumed to be deﬁned on the whole of Y .
2.4 Examples
Examples for this framework are the classical propositional judgment
aggregation, whereM is 2 = {0, 1} endowed with the Boolean algebra structure,
or probabilistic opinion pooling, where M is the standard MV-algebra [0, 1] and
the agenda corresponds to the σ-algebra of events. However, this framework also
encompasses aggregation problems with respect to more general many-valued
logics: All that is required is that the set of truth values forms an MV-algebra;
by that means, the framework proposed in this paper covers aggregation of
propositions in a large class of ﬁnite- and inﬁnite-valued logics as well. For
example, voting with abstentions can easily be modeled as an aggregation
problem in a three-valued logic, e.g. Łukasiewicz's L3.
3 Aggregator responsiveness axioms
In this section, we generalise (mostly standard) terminology from aggregation
theory, in order to be able to formulate our subsequent results on propositional-
attitude aggregators. We shall use the abbrevation
A(p) = (Ai(p))i∈N
for all propositions p ∈ X and all proﬁles A ∈ (MX)N .
Deﬁnition 2. An attitude aggregator F is rational if and only if for all rational
proﬁles A in the domain of F , F (A) is a rational attitude function.
Deﬁnition 3. An attitude aggregator F is universal if and only if its domain
comprises all rational proﬁles.
Independent aggregation means that the aggregate attitude towards any
proposition p does not depend on the individuals' attitudes towards propositions
other than p:
Deﬁnition 4. An attitude aggregator F is independent if and only if there
exists a map G :MN ×X →M such that for all proﬁles A in the domain of F
and for all p ∈ X, F (A)(p) = G (A(p), p).
Systematic aggregation is a special case of independent aggregation, where
G is constant in the second component, i.e. the aggregate attitude towards any
proposition p only depends on p through the individuals' attitudes towards p:
Deﬁnition 5. An attitude aggregator F is systematic if and only if there exists
a map f : MN →M , called decision criterion of F , such that for all proﬁles A
in the domain of F and for all p ∈ X,
F (A)(p) = f (A(p)) . (1)
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Remark 6. If the agenda contains some strictly contingent sentence p0, then
any universal systematic attitude aggregator F has a unique decision criterion.
Though it appears much stronger at ﬁrst sight, systematicity is under mild
conditions actually equivalent to independence (cf. Dietrich and List [2010,
Theorem 2]). At least as strong is the following notion (recall that rational
attitude functions can be uniquely extended to the closure of the agenda under
¬ and ⊕):
Deﬁnition 7. A systematic attitude aggregator F is strongly systematic if and
only if Equation (1) holds even for all p in the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕ and
all proﬁles A in the domain of F .
If the agenda is closed under ¬ and ⊕, then systematicity and strong
systematicity trivially coincide.
The Pareto principle asserts that any proposition which is rejected
unanimously by all individuals, must be collectively rejected:
Deﬁnition 8. An attitude aggregator F is Paretian if and only if for all proﬁles
A in the domain of F and all p ∈ X, if Ai(p) = 0 for all i ∈ N (i.e. A(p) = 0),
then F (A)(p) = 0.
A formula p ∈ L is called strictly contingent if and only if there exists for all
x ∈ M some M -valuation I with I(p) = x. For most of the paper, we need to
impose additional assumptions on the logical expressivity or complexity of the
agenda.
Deﬁnition 9. The agenda X is called complex if and only if there exists a
strictly contingent propositions p0 in X as well as strictly contingent propositions
p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 in the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕ such that for all M -valuations
I, one has I(p1)⊕I(p2) = I(p3) and ¬I(q1) = I(q2). If p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 are even
in X, then X is said to be rich.
Any conceivable combination of truth values can be obtained through M -
valuations of elements of rich agendas, hence their name. This will be the
key to the proof of our main result, via the notion of strongly systematisable
aggregators:
Deﬁnition 10. In this paper, a systematic attitude aggregator F for a complex
agenda X is called strongly systematisable if and only if F is either strongly
systematic or the agenda X is rich.
4 Results
Note that MN is  as the direct product of card(N) identical copies of M 
again an MV-algebra; the strong disjunction ⊕N and negation ¬N are deﬁned
componentwise, the zero element 0N is just the N -sequence 0 of 0's.
Theorem 11. If F is a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly systematisable
attitude aggregator, then the decision criterion of F is an MV-homomorphism.
Conversely, if f is an MV-homomorphism and F is deﬁned by Equation (1)
for all rational proﬁles A and all p ∈ X, then F is a rational, universal, Paretian
and systematic attitude aggregator.
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(The uniqueness of the decision criterion had already been noted in
Remark 6.)
If M = {0, 1} with the usual Boolean structure, then MN is again a Boolean
algebra and isomorphic to the power-set Boolean algebra of N . This allows us
to deduce, as an easy corollary to Theorem 11, the recent result in Herzberg
[2010]. Ultimately, this leads to Arrow's impossibility theorem for judgment
aggregation (recall the previous remark about the equivalence of systematicity
and independence under mild conditions).
Corollary 12. Suppose F is a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable attitude aggregator. If the algebra of truth values is Boolean,
then the decision criterion of F is a Boolean homomorphism.
If the algebra of truth values is just the Boolean algebra {0, 1} and the
electorate N is ﬁnite, then F is a dictatorship.
If M is the standard MV-algebra, then Theorem 11 yields McConway's
[1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools (weighted averaging) as a second
corollary:
Corollary 13. Let F be a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable aggregator, and let the algebra of truth values be the standard
MV-algebra [0, 1]. If the electorate N is ﬁnite, then the decision criterion of F
is a linear map from [0, 1]N to [0, 1].
5 Discussion
We have seen that one can neatly formulate an aggregation theory for general
many-valued propositional attitudes based on the theory of MV-algebras.
Aggregators satisfying common responsiveness axioms (agenda complexity
resp. richness, collective rationality, universality, systematicity resp. strong
systematicity, Pareto principle) then simply correspond to MV-homomorphisms
from MN to M (M being the MV-algebra of truth values). For special cases
of M , one can use classical classiﬁcation results for such homomorphisms to
obtain a classiﬁcation of Paretian systematic aggregators, e.g. if M is the
Boolean algebra 2 = {0, 1} (which leads to the judgment-aggregation analogue of
Arrow's [1963] impossibility theorem, cf. Dietrich and List [2007]) or M = [0, 1]
(which entails McConway's [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pooling).
More general aggregator classiﬁcations might be derived from MV-algebra
classiﬁcations (cf. Chang [1959], Mundici [1986], Cignoli and Mundici [1997]).
This algebraic approach to aggregation theory could be taken further by
taking Heyting algebras or BL-algebras as sets of truth values. By that means,
aggregation of intuitionistic resp. fuzzy propositional attitudes could be studied
in full generality.
A powerful alternative to algebraic aggregation theory is the model-theoretic
approach pioneered by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [1995], as it allows to study
aggregation problems for predicate logic in a natural manner as well. It remains
to be seen whether even many-valued aggregation problems can be studied by
model-theoretic methods; such an approach could pave the way for a systematic
analysis of aggregation problems in many-valued predicate logic. The algebraic
approach to many-valued model theory proposed by Zlato² [1981] might be a
ﬁrst starting point for such an endeavour.
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A Proofs
Proof of Remark 1. Let A be a rational attitude function. Consider any two
M -valuations I, I ′ such that A(p) = I(p) = I ′(p) for all p ∈ X or, more
precisely, A(p) = I([p]≡) = I ′([p]≡) for all p ∈ X. In other words, I and
I ′ are homomorphisms from L/ ≡ to M which agree on the set [X]≡ of ≡-
equivalence classes of elements of X. Thus, they must agree on the closure of
[X]≡ under the operations ¬ and ⊕ in L/ ≡. Call this closure [Y ]≡. Since the
operations ¬ and ⊕ in L/ ≡ are deﬁned representative-wise, [Y ]≡ equals the set
of equivalence classes of elements of Y (the closure of X under the operations
¬ and ⊕ in L). It follows that I([p]≡) = I ′([p]≡) for all p ∈ Y .
Proof of Remark 6. Let p0 be as in the statement of Remark 6, let f and f ′
be decision criteria of F , and let x = (xi)i∈N ∈ MN . Then there exists for
each i ∈ N some M -valuation Ii such that Ii(p0) = xi. Now each Ii induces a
rational attitude function Ai deﬁned by Ai(p) = Ii(p) for all p ∈ X, so that in
particular Ai(p0) = xi for all i ∈M . As F is universal, the proﬁle A = (Ai)i∈N
is in the domain of F . Hence
f(x) = f (A(p0)) = F (A)(p0) = f ′ (A(p0)) = f ′(x).
Proof of Theorem 11. Let F be a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable attitude aggregator, and let f be the decision criterion of F .
Consider any two elements of MN , x = (xi)i∈N and y = (yi)i∈N . Let
p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 be as in the deﬁnition of agenda complexity. Then on the one
hand, since p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 are strictly contingent by assumption, there exists
for each i ∈ N some M -valuations Ii, I ′i, I ′′i such that
• Ii(p1) = xi and Ii(p2) = yi,
• I ′i(q1) = xi,
• I ′′i (p1) = 0.
On the other hand, since p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 were assumed to be as in the deﬁnition
of agenda complexity, it follows for each i ∈ N ,
• not only Ii(p1) = xi and Ii(p2) = yi, but also Ii(p3) = xi ⊕ yi and
I(p3) = I(p1)⊕ I(p2) for every M -valuation I,
• not only I ′i(q1) = xi, but also I ′i(q2) = ¬xi and I ′(q2) = ¬I ′(q1) for every
M -valuation I ′,
• I ′′i (p1) = 0.
In other words, there exists an N -sequence I = (Ii)i∈N of M -valuations such
that
• I(p1) = x, I(p2) = y, I(p3) = x⊕N y and I(p3) = I(p1)⊕ I(p2) for every
M -valuation I,
• I ′(q1) = x, I ′(q2) = ¬Nx and I ′(q2) = ¬I ′(q1) for every M -valuation I ′,
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• I ′′(p1) = 0 = 0N .
Next note that by restricting each Ii, I ′i and I ′′i to the set of equivalence classes
of elements of X (recall that I(p) is shorthand for I([p]≡) for any M -valuation I
and any p ∈ L), one obtains rational attitude functions Ai, A′i and A′′i . All Ai,
A′i and A′′i are rational attitude functions and thus can be uniquely extended
to Y by Remark 1. Hence, we have constructed rational proﬁles A = (Ai)i∈N ,
A′ = (A′i)i∈N and A′′ = (A′′i )i∈N such that
• A(p1) = x, A(p2) = y, A(p3) = x ⊕N y, and I(p3) = I(p1) ⊕ I(p2) for
every M -valuation I,
• A′(q1) = x, A′(q2) = ¬Nx, and I ′(q2) = ¬I ′(q1) for every M -valuation I ′,
• A′′(p1) = 0N .
Note that since F is universal, the proﬁles A,A′, A′′ must be in the domain of
F . Since F is rational, F (A), F (A′) and F (A′′) are rational attitude functions
and thus can be uniquely extended to Y by Remark 1. Moreover, there exist
M -valuations I and I ′ such that F (A)(p) = I(p) as well as F (A′)(p) = I ′(p) for
all p ∈ X and hence, by the homomorphy of I, also for all p ∈ Y . From here, it
follows that
• F (A)(p3) = F (A)(p1)⊕ F (A)(p2),
• F (A′)(q2) = ¬F (A′)(q1).
Let us next exploit the choice of p1, p2, p3, q1, q2 as in the deﬁnition of agenda
complexity and the strong systematicity of F or the richness of X. This yields
for any M -valuation I which extends F (A),
f(x⊕N y) = f (A(p3)) = I(p3)
= I(p1)⊕ I(p2) = f (A(p1))⊕ f (A(p2)) = f(x)⊕ f(y).
Similarly (this time applying the formulae in the deﬁnition of agenda complexity
to an M -valuation I which extends F (A′)),
f(¬Nx) = f
(
A′(q2)
)
= I(q2)
= ¬I(q1) = ¬f
(
A′(q1)
)
= ¬f(x).
Thus, f preserves the operators ¬ and ⊕ and maps the zero element 0N of MN
to 0 ∈M ; hence, f is an MV-homomorphism.
Conversely, let f be an MV-homomorphism. Clearly, the F deﬁned by
Equation (1) for all rational proﬁles A and all p ∈ X is both systematic and
universal. Moreover, since f is a homomorphism, any composition of f with an
N -sequence of MV homomorphisms from L toM will again be a homomorphism
from L to M . In other words, the composition of f with an N -sequence of
valuations is again a valuation. This shows that the composition of f with a
rational proﬁle is a rational attitude function. Hence, the F deﬁned by Equation
(1) is rational. Since f(0N ) = f(0) = 0, it is clear that F is Paretian.
Proof of Corollary 12. If M is even a Boolean algebra, then so is MN . By
Theorem 11, the decision criterion f is an MV-homomorphism. Since any
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MV-homomorphism between two Boolean algebras is a Boolean homomorphism
(because the Boolean operations ∨ and ∧ as well as the constant 1 can be deﬁned
through ¬ and ⊕: x ∨ y = ¬(¬x ⊕ y) ⊕ y and x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y) for all x, y
and 1 = ¬0), it follows that f is actually a Boolean homomorphism. Boolean
algebra teaches that the shell of f , i.e. f−1{1} = f−1{¬0}, is a ﬁlter in 2N
(which is isomorphic to the power-set Boolean algebra of N), and if M = {0, 1},
then the shell of f is even an ultraﬁlter on N . Now if N is ﬁnite, this means
 as all ultraﬁlters on ﬁnite sets are principal  that there exists some i0 ∈ N
such that f−1{1} = {C ⊆ N : i0 ∈ C}. This, however, implies that F is a
dictatorship, the dictator being i0.
Proof of Corollary 13. Without loss of generality, we may assume N =
{1, . . . , n} for some positive integer n. By Theorem 11, the decision criterion
f : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] is an MV-homomorphism. This implies, if M is the standard
MV-algebra [0, 1], that
f (x1, . . . , xn)⊕ f (y1, . . . , yn) = f (x1 ⊕ y1, . . . , xn ⊕ yn)
for all x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn ∈ [0, 1]. Hence (by the deﬁnition of ⊕ in the Łukasiewicz
algebra, i.e. x ⊕ y = min{x + y, 1} for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] and the componentwise
deﬁnition of⊕ in the direct power [0, 1]N ) one has for all x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn ∈ [0, 1]
with xi + yi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N ,
f (x1, . . . , xn) + f (y1, . . . , yn) = f (x1 + y1, . . . , xn + yn) . (2)
One can now emulate McConway's [1981] original argument: An iterated
application of the preceding equation yields for all z1, . . . , zn ∈ [0, 1],
f (z1, . . . , zn) = f (z1, 0, . . . , 0) + f (0, z2, . . . , zn)
= f (z1, 0, . . . , 0) + f (0, z2, 0, . . . , 0) + f (0, 0, z3, . . . , zn)
=
n∑
i=1
f
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, zi, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
 .
Hence, deﬁnining fi by
fi(z) = f
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, z, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i

for every z ∈ [0, 1] and each i ∈ N , we obtain
f (z1, . . . , zn) =
n∑
i=1
fi (zi)
for all z1, . . . , zn ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, Equation (2) also implies fi(x + y) =
fi(x) + fi(y) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x + y ≤ 1 and each i ∈ N . Therefore,
every fi satisﬁes Cauchy's functional equation. Also, the range of every fi is
by deﬁnition contained in the range of f and thus in [0, 1], whence fi(x) is
nonnegative for all x ∈ [0, 1] and every i ∈ N . Therefore, there exists for
every i ∈ N some αi such that fi(x) = αix for all x ∈ [0, 1] (cf. Aczél [1961,
1966, Section 2.1.1, Theorem 1]), and this αi must be nonnegative. Thus,
f (z1, . . . , zn) =
∑n
i=1 αizi for all z1, . . . , zn ∈ [0, 1].
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